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Abstract
Purpose – Performance-based logistics (PBL) strategies are providing governments and for-profit
organizations with a contractual mechanism that reduces the life cycle costs of their systems. PBL
accomplishes this by establishing contracts that focus on the delivery of performance not parts. PBL
establishes a metric based governance structure where suppliers make more profit when they invest in
logistics process improvements, or system redesign, that reduces total cost of ownership. While work
has been done to outline an overall PBL theoretical framework, the underlying theory explaining the
enablers that lead to organizational and team-level, team-goal alignment associated with the PBL
governance structure requires testing. The purpose of this paper is to quantitatively test previously
posited relationships between enablers of PBL and PBL effectiveness. An additional objective is to
explore any differences in PBL effectiveness between different business sectors.
Design/methodology/approach – A multiple regression model was developed, tested and
validated to explain the effectiveness of PBL. The model was externally validated with exploratory
cross-sectional survey data of 61 practitioners.
Findings – This study strongly supports recent PBL theory explaining PBL effectiveness. Key
antecedents include investment climate, relational exchange, PBL leadership, and business sector.
Further, government organizations lag behind their commercial counterparts in PBL effectiveness and
PBL leadership.
Practical implications – PBL business arrangements are more effective in more favorable
investment climates. Thus, leaders should welcome new ideas, empower employees, and encourage
entrepreneurship. Since PBL effectiveness increases with relational exchange, building trust and
communicating with suppliers is key. Leadership is also important to PBL effectiveness. Leaders
should accept risk, focus on long-term affordability and performance, and align activities to achieve
end-user goals.
Originality/value – This research is the first quantitative test of previously posited factors affecting
PBL effectiveness. Additionally, this research unveils key differences in business sectors’ use of PBL
strategies.
Keywords Logistics management, Leadership, Performance-based logistics, Investment climate,
Sustainment, Outcome-based contracting, Post-production support, Logistics, Supportability
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The post-production logistics and product support costs associated with sustaining
large-scaled, complex systems such as aircraft fleets, rail, and power generation
facilities quite often exceed two to three times the research, development, and
production costs associated with these systems (Berkowitz et al., 2003). Adding
complexity to this costly reality is the fact that as systems age post-production
logistics and support costs tend to increase (MaClean et al., 2005). These costs represent
a significant logistics-related segment of the economy. For instance, the US commercial
airline industry spends in excess of $40 billion on maintenance, repair, and overhaul
(MRO) annually (Flint, 2007). For many systems, such as rail, power generation, and
aviation, the logistics, operations, and support costs during the post-production phase
often reflect the majority of the system’s total life cycle cost. Further, extending the life
of such systems requires more funds for repair, upgrade, and replacement.
Increasing costs and narrowing profit margins have caused system operators and
original equipment manufacturers (OEM) to seek strategies for post-production
support that moves away from the traditional mentality of purchasing spares and
repairs as a series of independent transactions (Sols et al., 2007). Seeking improved
business models, system operators are engaging in multi-year, performance based,
contracting approaches with their post-production logistics and support service
providers. Commonly called performance-based logistics (PBL), the objective of these
strategies is to provide a contractual structure that encourages investments that
controls cost, maintains profit margins, and decreases end-customer price (Randall et al.,
2010). For the OEMs and their partners, the goal is to meet customer requirements in a
cost effective, yet profitable manner, while also opening up new markets
(Hypko et al., 2010).
PBL offers a means to achieve these critical outcomes. It does so by laying out a
multi-year contractual framework, typically a firm-fixed price (FFP) contract, that
rewards suppliers when they make smart investments in material, technology, and
logistics processes which drive down life cycle cost (Kim et al., 2010; Sols et al., 2007).
Key to the PBL strategy is an innovation and investment governance structure (Geary
and Vitasek, 2008). However, the exact organizational enablers that influence a
manager to accept the risk associated with the shift to an investment-based business
model are not well understood (Geary et al., 2010).
This research uncovers and investigates the key enablers of PBL. This is important
as PBL is suggested to reduce cost and increase performance of large-scale, complex
systems, during their post-production logistics and support phase (Fowler, 2008). PBL
accomplishes this by providing contractual incentives for suppliers to infuse new
materials, technologies, and logistics processes that reduce life cycle cost (Randall et al.,
2010). Yet, it is unclear which factors system operators need to focus on in order to
maximize PBL effectiveness. The purpose of this study is to develop a set of
hypotheses, derived from an emerged theory of PBL enablers, and to empirically test
these hypotheses. Following that we explore whether the for-profit and not-for-profit
sectors share the same capabilities to implement and manage a PBL strategy.
This paper is organized in the following manner. First, we provide an overview of
PBL literature and develop a conceptual model with hypothesis. We then test three
antecedents in a multiple regression model to explain PBL effectiveness. Lastly, the





2. Literature review and conceptual model development and hypothesis
To identify the most relevant organizational predictors of PBL effectiveness, we first
examine the existing background on PBL. Next the underlying economics of PBL are
explained. The fundamental business model of PBL involves investing in innovations
that decrease system life cycle cost while maintaining a required performance level
(e.g. system up time, or percentage of assets ready to perform a mission). In this
framework, the knowledge, skills and abilities of the supplier network partners are
incontrovertibly linked to the underlying economics of PBL. Since knowledge, skills
and abilities play a prominent role in determining the economics of the PBL contract
and the achievement of a performance outcome in PBL, we review service-dominant
logic (SDL), an emerging knowledge-based exchange framework, for insights into the
theoretical underpinning of the PBL phenomenon.
2.1 Background on PBL
PBL is receiving increased attention in supply chain research (Kim et al., 2010, 2007;
Ng et al., 2009; Nowicki et al., 2008; Randall et al., 2010; Sols et al., 2007). Quite often the
logistics ecosystem associated with PBL is a three-tier system comprised of suppliers,
system integrators, and customers. We will refer to this three-tier system with its
resources, technologies, policies, procedures, and flows as the PBL ecosystem. PBL is a
post-production service strategy that is highly dependent on the supply chain
supporting its logistics ecosystem. Complex systems being supported through a PBL
strategy rely on activities and decisions that span across a broad array of functional
areas including research and development, engineering, operations, maintenance,
support, logistics, purchasing, and supply chain. An example in the defense industry is
the Joint Strike Fighter ( JSF) with Pratt & Whitney (supplier) supplying the engines to
Lockheed Martin (system integrator and OEM) who will then integrate all of the
components to provide mission capable JSFs for the US Department of Defense and its
allied partners (F-35 Program Office, 2011). There are similar relationships in the
commercial industry, such as the high-speed rail industry where the operator, the end
customer and the OEM are different agencies (Siemens, 2011). Other examples can be
found in the transportation sector (Transportation Research Board, 2009) and health
services sector (Administration for Children & Families, 2011; The World Bank, 2008).
PBL strategies have been credited with reducing the life cycle costs and improving
system performance when compared to the more traditional, transactional approach to
post-production logistics and support. Programs that have adopted PBL have
experienced system up time increases of 40 percent, logistics response times cut by
70 percent, all while generating billions of dollars in savings over traditional
approaches (Fowler, 2009, 2008). For instance, the US Navy saved $688M on the F/A-18
program using PBL, and the UK Defense Ministry saved $250M converting its CH-47
post-production logistics and support contract to PBL (Fowler, 2008). There are similar
PBL success stories dealing with projects in the for-profit sector. For instance, one
recent study of a major Dutch housing project showed that life cycle cost was reduced
by 20 percent using a PBL approach (Straub, 2009).
In order to compare and contrast PBL with traditional approaches to logistics and
post-production support we provide a series of systemigrams. Systemigrams provide
researchers an ability to convey in a conceptual manner the inter-relationships of a




of traditional post-production logistics and support. In the traditional post-production
logistics and support the major business entities are: suppliers, OEMs, MRO providers,
system operators, and customers. Here we use the airline and rail industry as an example
of the traditional post-production support structure. The overarching concern of the
system operator (e.g. airline or rail company) is to meet customer requirements while
profitably operating the system. For the airline and rail industry this means profitably
operating routes and schedules at a particular price and comfort level (Flint, 2007;
Siemens, 2011).
As shown in the Figure 1, the system operator’s primary core competency revolves
around determining profitable routes and schedules and operating a system that meets
these schedules requirements while dealing with disruptions (e.g. weather, change in
customer desire) as they occur (Randall et al., 2010; Siemens, 2011). Within a traditional
post-production logistics and support system, the operators (e.g. the airline or the rail
company) manage a network of warehouses, inventory, equipment, and people that keep
the system in service or return the system to service when it breaks (Hypko et al., 2010;
Kim et al., 2010). Considering the complexity of determining routes and price, it can be
argued that running, maintaining, and integrating the post-production logistics and
support infrastructure is a secondary competency of the rail and airline operator. This
model has little benefit for the end customer and the system operator who are saddled with
such issues as corrosion, diminishing manufacturing sources (e.g. parts that are no longer
being produced), and fatigue (MaClean et al., 2005). As issues emerge, the system operators
typically do not have the expertise, time, or funding needed to control and reduce the life
cycle costs of the system (Cited from Air Force-Magazine Online, March 19, AirForce




























































in-house capability to improve the reliability and design of the fielded system.
Unfortunately the organization most capable of reducing life cycle cost, the OEM, typically
moves on to the next research design and production effort leaving post-production
support in the hands of a hodgepodge of suppliers and operators (Randall, 2009).
This structure establishes competing objectives (e.g. OEM/supplier desire to sell
more spares and repairs) with little incentive to invest in life cycle cost reduction beyond
production (Geary and Vitasek, 2008). Without innovation and involvement from the
OEM and suppliers the efficiency of the post-production support infrastructure;
characterized here as the operator’s ability to integrate its warehouse, inventory,
transportation, procurement, and labor functions, is limited (Randall et al., 2010). As
shown in Figure 1, a great deal of the expertise needed to run the post-production
infrastructure actually resides with the OEMs and MRO providers. Further, the operator
seldom has the technical capability to control, much less reduce, cost as systems age and
fatigue, manufacturing sources diminish, and corrosion takes a toll (MaClean et al., 2005).
As shown in Figure 2, PBL corrects incentive misalignment in the post-production
logistics and support network, and transfers roles and responsibilities to entities most
capable of performing these tasks efficiently and effectively (Randall et al., 2010). As a
result, PBL manifests itself as a solution that effectively leverages the existing expertise
that resides with the OEMs, suppliers, and MRO providers. PBL drives a governance
structure that codifies the role of a systems integrator as the entity that establishes and
performs critical supply chain integration functions across the life cycle of the system
(Randall et al., 2010). Since the system integrator is now responsible for integrating


































































(e.g. warehouses, inventory, and transportation), the operators are now free to focus on
their expertise – the actual operations of the system (e.g. route scheduling and pricing).
PBL integration is therefore particularly effective when the integrator (e.g. the OEM)
keeps elements of the research, design, and production supplier network in place to
manage and logistically support the system during post-production (Randall et al., 2010).
This means that the integrator and suppliers are now capable of balancing and optimizing
the cost of inventory, transportation, warehousing, and on-equipment maintenance and
MRO against the potential to reduce those costs through redesign. This makes sense for a
number of reasons. The OEM and the suppliers are in the best position to make initial
forecasts of the reliability and subsequent demand for parts, and then to update those
forecast models as the system evolves during use (Kim et al., 2010; Randall et al., 2010).
Further, the OEM and suppliers are typically most capable of affordably redesigning
components to drive out costs or bad actors (Randall, 2009). As new technology, materials,
and logistics processes become mature, these same suppliers are most capable of
improving the design of both consumables and repairables to infuse those improvements
into the system as the system fails – thus reducing future logistics costs.
There are two keys differences between a PBL contract and traditional
post-production support. The first involves contracting for performance, or an
outcome, rather than repeatedly contracting for discrete products and services (Geary
and Vitasek, 2008). Under a PBL arrangement the buyer contracts for system
performance, typically characterized as system “up time” as opposed to contracting for
spare parts and repair services. System “up time” is defined as the amount of time the
system is ready to perform (e.g. aircraft fleets) or does perform (e.g. power generation
networks) divided by the amount of time possible for that system to be “up.” The
supplier is then free to ensure this contractual “up time” is achieved as efficiently and
effectively as possible (Geary and Vitasek, 2008). The second key to PBL involves its
reliance on a multi-year relationship. The multi-year relationship gives the supplier
network time to determine whether certain reliability issues might be better served
through redesign as opposed to continued procurement of support resources and
services such as spares and repairs (Randall et al., 2010). These contract dynamics of
PBL result in a structure where the integration, accountability, and risk for achieving
performance objectives is left with those organizations who have the greatest set of
relevant knowledge, skills, and abilities (Randall et al., 2010).
2.2 The economics of PBL: investment driven by cost avoidance
The multi-year contract of the PBL strategy provides the supplier network the incentive
to trade the cost of a system redesign against the future cost of spares, repairs, MRO,
transportation, and warehousing associated with future failures (Kim et al., 2007, 2010).
In this way, PBL provides managers insight into the tradeoff between classic logistics
functions (procurement, inventory, warehouse, and transportation) and improved
system design (Randall et al., 2010). Ultimately, PBL provides a strategy where the goal
is to “design out” logistical demand by reducing the frequency (i.e. improving the
reliability) for the need for spares, transportation, and warehousing.
PBL changes the basic business model of post-production support. Both PBL and
non-PBL managers focus on gaining efficiency and effectiveness with regard to
inventory management, repair, and overhaul. Yet for the PBL manager, the money





an investment in new materials, processes, and technology that will improve reliability
and correspondingly drive out demand for that particular spare part (and its warehouse,
inventory, and transportation cost), along with repair or overhaul tasks (Kim et al., 2010,
2007; Randall et al., 2010). The PBL contract uses cost avoidance incentives to focus
upstream trading partners on the outcome that matters most to the end-user – an
operational system at the lowest possible cost. Figure 3 shows this pictorially. This
figure, or some variation of it, has been shown in nearly all PBL research, seminars,
education and training, and conferences[1].
In a traditional post-production support business model, the customer pays a
transactional fee for each task required to keep the system in service (e.g. spare parts,
overhaul, and repair). This transactional business model has no avenue for investments
focused on reducing cost. As systems age, the repairable parts wear out, fatigue
accumulates, sources of supply diminish, performance degrades, and the cost of
post-production support increases (MaClean et al., 2005). In Figure 3, this is shown as the
cost increases over time by the lines labeled traditional industry price and traditional
industry cost. The age-based cost increases and performance decreases are what led to
the development of the PBL strategy. As costs continue to balloon, operators under the
traditional post-production support business model found themselves accepting
significant risk when a lack of coordination across the supply chain resulted in material
shortages, diminishing sources of supply, and system down-time due to stock outs
(Nowicki et al., 2008; Sols et al., 2007).
Performance-based approaches convert the continuous transactional spending of
traditional post-production support (e.g. MRO) into large pools of cost avoidance
(Randall et al., 2010). This potential pool of cost avoidance represents the area under
the traditional price (for post-production support services). The PBL strategy
encourages suppliers to make initial investments (as shown at the left side of Figure 3)
that reduce total life cycle costs (as shown at the right side of Figure 3).
Typically, PBL uses some type of multi-year, FFP contract to create an incentive
structure that encourages supplier investment in innovation (Garnder, 2008).
Under a FFP contract, the supplier assumes the risk of performance since it agrees
Figure 3.
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to perform the work for a fixed price. If the work costs more than expected, these
additional costs to achieve the contractually agreed upon performance reduce the
supplier’s expected profit. The incentive works in the opposite direction too; if the
supplier can perform below its estimated costs, costs avoided become additional profit.
Such a contract structure is critical to create the incentive that encourages the supplier
network to invest in some type of innovation that can avoid costs in the future, as
shown in Figure 3. For example, one of the managers we interviewed mentioned that
prior to initiating a particular PBL contract the customer was faced with a high repair
cost due to aircraft engine component that required frequent inspection and overhaul.
When the customer and OEM switched to a PBL contract, the OEM redesigned the
component to increase the time between inspections and removal. The OEM recouped
its investment (i.e. the redesign) within a few years. After the initial investment was
recouped, the subsequent savings amounted to a return on the investment. After a
contractually agreed to period of time, those savings were passed on to the customer as
part of a new, lower PBL price. Under the previous non-PBL relationship, the customer
did not have the expertise to perform the redesign, nor did the customer typically have
the financial resources in the current or following-year budget to afford the redesign.
The OEM had both the expertise and, using a return-on-investment model as
justification, corporate funding. Additionally, the OEM is oftentimes able to gain
expertise and funding for redesigns from its supplier network.
In order for PBL to be effective, the buyer must foster a climate that encourages and
supports investments. For the purpose of this research, we define investment climate as
the inclination of the organization to invest in reliability or process improvements. We
define PBL effectiveness as the improvement of outcomes through the use of investment
and the application of knowledge-based resources. Improvements in performance
outcomes are largely influenced by the use of investments and the application of
knowledge-based resources. PBL essentially acts on a return-on-investment model that
drives innovations to achieve long-term performance and affordability goals for the
customer, while improving overall PBL ecosystem profitability. As such, it is posited that:
H1. There is a positive relationship between investment climate and PBL
effectiveness.
PBL theory based on SDL. Randall et al. (2010) firmly grounded PBL theory in SDL
(Vargo and Lusch, 2004). SDL suggests that competitive advantage for the supplier
network resides in the supplier network’s ability to use their knowledge, skills, and
abilities to create value, by meeting service requirements, and this value is likely to
evolve over time (Vargo and Lusch, 2004). By focusing on value, as oppose to production,
both PBL and SDL draws attention to how supplier networks use knowledge, skills, and
abilities to satisfy customer requirements as oppose to focusing on simply providing
products which customers, in turn, integrate with other products to satisfy their needs
(Randall et al., 2010; Vargo and Lusch, 2004). Using a SDL framework, value is based
upon how well the supplier is able to satisfy a customer service requirement while
ensuring reasonable long-term profitability for the supplier network. For example,
a system operator may take a short-term approach by continuing to order spare parts
and repair services, yet what that operator may ultimately need is the long-term vision
to redesign the system that maintains operational capability for the lowest total cost of





of new material, processes, and technology that have the ability to provide the system
operator an available system for less total costs. With the proper contract structure,
suppliers are likely to act when redesign is more affordable than continually purchasing
spare parts, repairs, and overhauls in a transactional manner. Absent a PBL-SDL
framework, the supplier is likely to continue to act in a transactional manner. With an
SDL mindset, that is a propensity to act in an entrepreneurial manner, the supplier may
seek innovations that better deliver to the customer’s ultimate need – better system
availability at a lower total cost.
A strength of SDL is that it considers value from both the perspective of the end
customer and from the supplier network, thus making SDL a robust supply chain
framework (Lambert and Garcı´a-Dastugue, 2006). Using this framework, Randall et al.
(2010) found that practitioners essentially operationalized the outcome of SDL by
assigning some measure of performance (e.g. system up time) as the desired customer
value proposition. This SDL-PBL theory structure provides a contractual ability to
measure and reward value for all members of the supplier network. Consistent with
successful applications of PBL, value for the supplier network is defined as the ability
of the supplier network to gain knowledge of the customer performance requirements,
and the supplier network’s ability to provide for current requirements while
positioning themselves to meet future performance requirements in a manner that is
profitable for the supplier network (Randall et al., 2010).
By providing measures of value for all network participants, the SDL-PBL model
clearly focuses on collaboration and clear definitions of co-creation (Jaworski and
Kohli, 2006). This co-creation between the operator, end customer, integrator, and
suppliers brings significant knowledge resources. Those resources are likely to predict
the competitive position of the particular supplier network (Randall et al., 2010). These
knowledge resources, customer and supplier knowledge, skill, and ability are likely to
change over time. Supply chain management, based in an SDL framework and
supported by performance-based supplier network theory, then provides an effective
mechanism to show how certain PBL ecosystems, their suppliers, customers, and
integrator, can efficiently adapt to environmental changes, and thus predict
competitive advantage of that network. The key to that competitive advantage is
the flow of knowledge-based resources between the supplier network partners as
focused on satisfying a customer service requirement.
In SDL, the primary flow is applied knowledge rather than goods (Lusch et al., 2010).
The service-based view of SDL facilitates measurement of applied knowledge as it meets
service requirements. Since the customer is a co-creator of value, SDL advocates
dialogue with the customer about the application of knowledge (Jaworski and Kohli,
2006). SDL is also relational – meaning elements such as co-dependence, mutual trust,
commitment, and shared values are important (Vargo and Lusch, 2004). Recent a theory
of PBL enablers suggests that cooperative interdependency is a key enabler of objective
performance (Geary et al., 2010). We define relational exchange as the inclination to
engage in collaboration and trust with a focus on the end customer. Since PBL is
grounded in SDL, and since PBL requires long-term relations, it is posited that:
H2. Relational exchange positively influences PBL effectiveness.
Strategies requiring the alignment of substantial resources (human, financial, and




a common vision (Eisenbeiss et al., 2008). PBL is no exception. With PBL, mustering and
aligning such resources across firms compounds the problem. Theory of PBL enablers
highlights the importance of leadership in creating a climate conducive for innovation
(Geary et al., 2010). Along these lines, Randall et al. (2010) specifically identified firm and
network leadership as a key antecedent of a PBL process and outcome. Leaders in PBL
promote creative ideas by challenging assumptions, approaching old situations in new
ways, and allowing risk taking. These are essential ingredients for PBL. We define PBL
leadership as the ability to create a performance-based focus, align activities, and
develop an entrepreneurial (risk accepting) culture. Therefore, it is posited that:
H3. PBL leadership positively influences PBL effectiveness.
Business sector. PBL strategies have been highly successful in the not-for-profit
(e.g. government) and the for-profit business sectors. In some complex cases, these
sectors are combined, where responsibility for the primary systems integrator is shared
(Geary et al., 2010). Whether the PBL strategy includes strictly not-for profit or for-profit
entities or both, we should expect differing capabilities in PBL implementation and
management based upon the business sector due to differences in organizational
systems and accountability (Morash et al., 1996; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).
More specifically, we would expect that managers in the not-for-profit sector would
have a different implementation result in comparison to those in the for-profit sector.
Government procurement is less concerned with efficient outcomes (Husted and
Reinecke, 2009; Muller, 1991; Solomon, 1986), and is subject to substantially greater
transparency, fairness, and public scrutiny (Harland et al., 2000; Kolchin, 1990;
Sheth et al., 1983). Government procurement is highly regulated via federal contracting
statutes and regulations (Harland et al., 2000; Kolchin, 1990; Lian and Laing, 2004;
Rainey and Backoff, 1976; Sheth et al., 1983; Williams and Bakhshi, 1988) that
discourage either close or long-term relationships with suppliers (Hawkins et al., 2011).
But, the expected long-term duration of the relationship between a buyer and supplier
decreases opportunism (Gundlach et al., 1995; Johnson et al., 2003; Joshi and Randall,
2001; Jap and Anderson, 2003). As such, the numerous regulatory boundaries
encircling government procurement encourage discrete transactions versus relational
exchange (Dwyer et al., 1987; Harland et al., 2000; Lian and Laing, 2004). Furthermore,
government procurement’s rigidity devalues, and in many cases explicitly prohibits, the
principle tenets of buyer-supplier relations such as durability, consistency, expansion,
trust, and commitment (Dwyer et al., 1987; Morgan and Hunt, 1994), resulting in
degraded supplier relations (Guinipero, 1984). Since these relational norms are:
. structurally suppressed in government not-for-profit procurement;
. prevalent among for-profit commercial business relationships; and
. necessary for effective PBL, and since these norms reduce opportunism, it is not
unreasonable to posit that:
H4. Business sector affects PBL effectiveness.
The fundamental premise of Randall et al.’s (2010) theory of PBL is that PBL motivates
investments, and that investments ultimately result in improvements in efficiency
and effectiveness. These improvements are enabled by organizational factors





(Randall et al., 2010). In order to reap greater effectiveness using a PBL strategy,
organizations must demonstrate higher levels of the enablers. While logical, these
propositions have not been quantitatively tested. Therefore, we propose to test, in an
exploratory fashion, whether there is an overall perception of improved performance
for PBL versus traditional post-production support, and whether the key enablers of
PBL are more prevalent in PBL where PBL support strategies are employed:
H5. Measures of PBL effectiveness and enablers of PBL will be greater for PBL
than for traditional post-production support.
3. Methodology
This study employed a mixed method design (Creswell, 2003) of qualitative and
quantitative analysis. The qualitative work involved discussions with academicians
and practitioners to ensure the proposed model achieved face validity and used valid
measures of constructs. Further, this research benefited from close relationship with,
and access to the data involved in the studies by Randall et al. (2010) and Geary et al.
(2010). Following the development of the constructs, the research involved a regression
model (Figure 4) using cross-sectional survey data in order to test the hypotheses. The
remainder of this section details the qualitative design, survey development, the
sample, data collection, and reliability and validity.
This approach, using a mixed method design, is typical for emerging areas of research
and for areas involving new, substantive theory or frameworks. Our approach is similar to
other multi-manuscript research projects such as market orientation (Jaworski and Kohli,
1993; Kohli and Jaworski, 1990; Kohli et al., 1993) and service quality (Parasuraman et al.,
1994, 1985, 1988) that involved identifying new frameworks, constructs, and relationships
using a grounded, qualitative methodology, and then building on that research to test
those relationships in subsequent, quantitative investigation.
3.1 Qualitative design
The Randall et al. (2010) and Geary et al. (2010) research provided a detailed overview
of the process involved in generating the constructs adapted in this research.





















and conferences with practitioners. Table I provides an overview of the participants
involved in the qualitative aspect of this study. This sample builds on the one of
Randall et al. (2010) by incorporating those interviews from Geary et al. (2010).
As shown in Table I, participants were drawn from a number of defense programs.
Interviews were conducted with end customers, bill paying customers[2], OEMs, and
suppliers. The participants came from a wide variety of corporate functions
(e.g. finance, engineering, and logistics). Methodologically, this investigation followed
the process similar to Randall et al. (2010). That approach gave us the foundation for the
constructs to be investigated and for the development of the initial survey. As such, the
qualitative portion of this mixed method design was used to establish the hypothesized
antecedents.
3.2 Operational measures
This study involves two largely empirically untested concepts, PBL and SDL. Because
of this, there are no scales that are readily available or adaptable to this survey
investigation. Therefore, the first step associated with the operational measures
required us to adapt the findings from the qualitative portion of the investigation and
to create initial survey items.
One of the key strengths of the qualitative investigations in general and grounded
theory investigations in particular, are that the constructs that emerge in such
investigations are captured using the voice of the practitioner. This allows the
researcher to simply search back through transcripts to find paragraphs, sentences, and
phrases that represent the emerged constructs using the language of the practitioner.
This provides the researcher the ability to develop survey items using the words of the
practitioner. These words are likely to be more readily recognized and understood by
the practitioners – thus improving validity.
Survey items were created and assessed on a five-point Likert-type scale. After the
initial items were developed, a group of industry and academic experts reviewed the
items for clarity and validity consistent with Dillman (2000). Next, an initial pre-test of
the survey was conducted on line. This pretest further refined the individual items,
addressed any issues with ambiguity, and tested the flow of the survey itself.
Similar to Jaworski and Kohli (1993), specific managers involved in the qualitative
research portion of the study, and from varying functions, were asked to complete
the pretest. Based on feedback from the pre-test, some items were modified and others








Overall (%) 35 12 5 20 8 20
Break out by supply
chain position
Customer 53% Supplier 47%
Years experience 1-5 6-9 10-14 15-20 20 þ
9% 5% 12% 39% 33%
Note: Interviews transcribed (four people interviewed twice, 58 transcribed, 20 not transcribed)
Table I.
Participant background





3.3 Sample and data collection
An online survey was used to collect the data. In order to maximize the response rate, we
used Dillman’s (2000) Tailored Design Method for internet surveys. The survey
deployment involved an initial e-mail to approximately 350 managers concerned with
PBL strategies. The sample was drawn from an e-mail list used in association with the
annual Performance Based Logistics Conference in Crystal City, Virginia. A total of
94 responses were received. However, many were deleted due to missing data. The
effective sample size became 61 resulting in a response rate of 17.4 percent. Table II
shows respondent demographics.
4. Analysis and results
The following section reports on the analysis and results. The section begins with a
review of the reliability and validity of the survey instrument. Next hypotheses are
tested and the general model is presented.
4.1 Reliability and validity
The survey was administered with 41 questions that compared PBL to traditional
post-production support. Of the questions, 15 were statements to evaluate PBL metrics
and the structure of a PBL contract. These questions were both of interest to the
researchers in regards to exploring the PBL phenomena further, and were requested by
defense industry experts involved in the study. These questions did not deal with
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this study. Table III provides an overview of all the survey items and provides
a comparison of mean values based upon the applicability of each question to PBL and
traditional post-production support.
Construct validity was assessed through exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using
principal components with an equimax rotation. Eigenvalues greater than one was
the criterion for determining the number of factors (Hair et al., 2010). In order to ensure
sufficient power to detect significant factor loadings given the sample size, items were
considered to have loaded to a factor where factor correlations exceeded at least 0.65 on
one factor (Hair et al., 2010), and were less than 0.33 on any other factor. Through
iterative scale purification (Churchill, 1979), 26 survey items reduced to 17 across the
four latent factors. Nine items were removed due to excessive cross loadings. The
remaining items loaded on four factors. As evidence of nomological validity, we
examined the four factors’ correspondence to the constructs identified by Randall et al.’s
(2010) theory-building article on PBL. “PBL effectiveness” corresponded to
Randall et al.’s (2010) “continuous value creation” and “effect.” “Relational exchange”
corresponded to Randall et al.’s (2010) “integration” and “co-management.” “Investment
climate” corresponded to “influence a performance oriented mindset,” and “PBL
leadership” corresponded to “promote PBL competencies.” In each case, the directions of
relationships corresponded to the predicted directions posited by Randall et al.’s (2010)
theory. The reliability of latent constructs was assessed using Cronbach’s a. These
measures, ranging from 0.64 to 0.94, proved to be sufficiently reliable – exceeding
the minimum acceptable threshold of 0.6 for exploratory research (Hair et al., 2010). The
final measurement scale used for the EFA is displayed in the Appendix. Table IV
displays the factors, factor loadings, and cumulative variance explained.
Often survey data is susceptible to various biases. We tested for common method
variance using Harman’s one-factor test. Harman’s one-factor test revealed that when all
of the items were run in a single factor analysis, the unrotated solution did not result in a
single factor, nor did it result in a general factor that accounted for most of the
covariation (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). We then tested for non-response bias using
the procedure of Armstrong and Overton (1977). In order to preserve power – given the
small sample size – while simultaneously distinguishing between early and late
responders, we removed ten responses from the center of the data (by response date) and
created groups of early and late responses. We tested for differences in-group means
across the five variables in the model and across ten additional variables not included in
the model but shown in Table III. Continuous measures were tested using ANOVA,
and group counts (e.g. sector) were tested using a x 2 test. Of the 15 tests, one difference
was detected in PBL leadership. However, across many tests, some differences
will occur by chance. Thus, we concluded that non-response bias did not distort the
results.
4.2 Hypothesis testing
The hypotheses were tested using linear multiple regression. Consistent with Hair et al.
(2010) the scale items were summed on each construct and introduced into the regression
analysis. The pertinent assumptions of regression (i.e. normality, heteroscedasticity,
and independence of error terms) were first tested as follows. Since the sample size was
small, we applied the Shapiro-Wilks test of normality. Only relational exchange








Leadership welcomes new ideas 3.44 3.25
People are empowered to make decisions * 3.48 2.98
People act entrepreneurial * 3.74 2.64
Affordability is improved * 3.83 2.49
System performance is improved * 4.21 2.70
Suppliers are more customer focused * 4.07 2.79
It is hard to change things 3.67 3.87
Industry focuses on creating end customer value * 4.02 2.82
Opportunities pass us by 3.56 3.64
It is easy to get a good idea implemented * 2.93 2.41
Supply chain collaboration is strong * 3.95 2.49
People find creative solutions * 4.10 3.03
Vendors understand war fighter needs * 3.65 3.02
There is a quick response to changes in warfighter requirements * 3.66 2.51
Leadership has a long-term focus on affordability and
performance * 3.80 2.62
Leaders align activities to achieve warfighter goals * 3.90 2.95
Leadership accepts risk taking * 3.43 2.62
The sustainment strategy creates alignment between individual
tasks and overall sustainment objectives * 4.03 2.81
Support providers make too much profit 2.56 2.80
Best value decisions means taking a life cycle cost perspective * 4.20 3.16
The project team has a shared vision of its purpose * 4.16 3.16
There are clear sustainment objectives * 4.16 3.10
There is a team approach that encourages active participation * 4.33 3.10
Team approach fosters innovation * 4.28 3.11
There is significant innovation * 3.93 2.61
The contract metrics make sense * 3.75 3.00
Cost is avoided * 3.72 2.38
Opportunities for return on investment are good * 4.08 2.83
Metrics create desired performance * 4.20 2.78
Cost avoidance decisions are rewarded * 3.73 2.67
Industry and government trust * 3.51 2.53
People know how their work impacts the end customer * 4.05 3.25
Communication between industry and government is effective * 3.81 2.89
Vendors drive innovations that save money * 3.82 2.52
Depots have long-term viability * 3.82 3.39
Incentivizes investment in reliability * 4.09 2.30
This strategy is likely to find money to avoid costs * 3.79 2.42
We need more expertise to help improve the results of this
strategy * 4.39 3.30
Uses knowledge and skill to improve performance and
affordability * 4.10 3.07
There is transparency with respect to “true cost” to sustain * 3.34 2.64
Knowledge is only valuable when it is shared by supply chain
partners * 3.87 3.64
Investment in reliability improvement requires multi-year
contracts * 4.28 3.31









(PBL effectiveness – cubed; PBL leadership – squared; investment climate – squared).
Only investment climate did not achieve a non-significant Shapiro-Wilks statistic
( p , 0.02). Next, we tested the constructs for homoscedasticity using the Levene’s test
(1.59; p , 0.25). Results indicated satisfaction of the assumption of constant error
variance. Finally, we examined the Durbin-Watson statistic (2.24) to ensure that error
terms were independent. Since it was within the range of 1.5-2.5, we concluded that the
error terms were independent. Although the independent variables were significantly
correlated, all of the variance inflation factors were less than 1.7 indicating that
multicollinearity did not pose a problem. Table V displays parameter estimates,
significance levels, and the explanatory power of the model. The model is given as:
Y 3 ¼ b0 þ b1X21 þ b2X2 þ b3X23 þ b4X4 þ 1i;
where:
Y ¼ PBL effectiveness (PBL).
X1 ¼ investment climate (IC).
X2 ¼ relational exchange (RE).
X3 ¼ PBL leadership (L).
X4 ¼ business sector.






















Percentage of variance explained 28.45 44.31 58.42 70.60
Factor mean 3.55 3.79 3.71 3.96
Factor SD 1.01 0.63 0.81 0.71








Variable X4 was a dummy variable with the for-profit firms serving as the reference
group (coded 0). With a negative coefficient, the not-for-profit group shows lower PBL
effectiveness (summated scale mean 31.90) than does the for-profit group (mean 37.96).
As an additional test of H4, differences in the three key enablers of PBL were tested
using ANOVA. Only PBL leadership differed (F ¼ 17.64; p , 0.001) with the for-profit
sector exhibiting significantly greater PBL leadership (mean 12.02) than the
not-for-profit sector (mean 9.63). As seen in Table V, all four predictors show
significant path estimates, with relational exchange having the greatest effect on PBL
effectiveness. Additionally, a respectable amount of variance in PBL effectiveness
(53 percent) was explained by the four independent variables. Given these results, the
4 main hypotheses were supported. Correlations among the constructs are shown in
Table VI. Turning back to Table III, we note that only four out of the 42 items do not
indicate a statistically significant difference. In nearly all items, the means of PBL
exceed those of traditional post-production support. Thus, support is found for H5.
5. Discussion
The traditional approach to post-production support drives inherent inefficiencies and
tension between buyers and suppliers by tying the supplier’s profit to the amount of
post-production support services they sell. The more parts break, the more service the
suppliers are able to sell. This return on sales model demonstrates the negativity associated
with a transactional arrangement where the majority of the risk is absorbed by the
customer (Sols et al., 2007). The customer ends up bearing the financial burden associated
with the uncertainties in reliability, fatigue, corrosion, diminishing manufacturing sources,
stock outs, along with warehouse and inventory costs necessary to protect against these
uncertainties. For the supplier, the business relationship is satisfactory – but not
Investment climate Relational exchange PBL leadership PBL effectiveness
Investment climate 0.86
Relational exchange 0.34 * 0.64
PBL leadership 0.44 * 0.31 * * 0.74
PBL effectiveness 0.46 * 0.44 * 0.55 * 0.94




DV: PBL effectiveness Standardized coefficient t p . jtj Sig.
Intercept 28,939 20.74 0.46
Explanatory variables
Investment climate 0.21 2.04 0.046 * *
Relational exchange 0.35 3.51 0.001 *
PBL leadership 0.22 1.89 0.064 * * *
Business sector 20.28 22.73 0.009 *
Adjusted R 2 0.53
Prob. . F 17.86 0.000 *






outstanding – as the amount of profit available is typically limited to 8-12 percent of sales
under a typical sustainment cost-plus contract (Krieg, 2006). While the suppliers have
limited risk of loss, they also have a low probability of generating significant profit.
PBL drives behaviors that reduce costs for the operator while providing increased
profit potential for the supplier networks. That profit potential is based upon a
return-on-investment business model that creates a win-win strategy. In stagnate markets
where opportunities for revenue expansion are limited; a PBL profit model provides very
real options. For instance, a PBL-driven post-production support cost reduction of
$10 million translates directly into profit. For a company with a 10 percent profit margin,
$10 million in post-production support cost avoidance would require $100 million in new
sales to create an equivalent profit (Randall and Farris, 2009). PBL gives executives,
systems engineers, and supply chain managers charged with operating low-profit,
high-cost systems a viable approach to battle decreasing revenue and reductions in market
share. At the same time, the customer wins through improved affordability and
performance, along with the opportunity to harvest cost savings under follow-on contract
awards.
Further, PBL is an inherently resource conscious strategy whose underlying
economic model is good for the physical environment. The economic model at the core
of PBL creates an incentive for manufacturers and suppliers to innovate and reduce
total system and life cycle costs. This means that decisions are made to invest in some
type of improvement that leads to an out-year cost savings (typically through
improved reliability). Those out-year cost savings represent significantly less resource
consumption. Systems that do not break use fewer resources and create less waste.
These substantial performance outcomes are only possible by first understanding the
organizational enablers that facilitate PBL strategies. Relying on previous theory-building
work (Randall et al., 2010) and firmly grounding this investigation in SDL (Vargo and
Lusch, 2004), this research finds quantitative support for several of its postulates.
Specifically, PBL strategies, and their ensuing performance improvement and cost savings,
become more effective where there is a stronger, supportive climate for investment. This
means that leadership must welcome new ideas, empower their employees, and cultivate a
climate where personnel behave entrepreneurially. To build such a climate, supply chain
executives could incorporate innovation as an employee performance evaluation criterion
for logistics managers. They could also institute a suggestion program where employees
are paid a cash award for adopted innovations. Additionally, supply chain leaders
must educate their employees and suppliers on PBL contracts, to include FFP pricing,
defining the scope of work, and defining key performance metrics. Suppliers who receive
PBL contracts should apportion funds for redesigns and innovations, resembling
internal venture capital funds established for new product development.
PBL strategies become more effective with stronger relational exchange. Key to
fostering effective PBL relationships is trust, communication, and the knowledge of how
decisions at various levels of the supply chain affect end customer value. As fewer PBL
suppliers replace the many transactional providers of spare parts and repair services,
the strategic importance of the PBL supplier should increase. This could necessitate that
relationships between executives at each firm be established, and that supply managers
be educated on the value of sustaining relational (versus arms-length) exchange.
This research also shows the importance of leadership. PBL effectiveness increases





and align activities to achieve end-user goals. The need for leadership underscores
the importance that supply chain leaders be represented in the firm’s executive board room
in order to show how PBL can contribute to the firm’s strategic goals, and to garner the
resources and support necessary to implement PBL arrangements. The need for leadership
also suggests that firms hire and retain knowledgeable supply chain leaders who can
recognize opportunities, influence system design, motivate suppliers and employees, and
design supporting processes. A key supporting process is spend analysis, used to identify
the spare parts and repair services that are procured, the number of contracts used, and the
number of different suppliers. Supply chain leaders will also need to examine internal
maintenance statistics. Armed with this information, supply managers can conduct
market research to find leading PBL suppliers, start a dialogue with them, and identify the
optimal systems or sub-systems for PBL support strategies. Once determined, supply
managers can begin a comprehensive source selection to find the optimal PBL partners.
This research unveils a significant difference in the PBL effectiveness and in one of
its enablers, PBL leadership, between for-profit and not-for-profit entities with
for-profits having a stronger competence. Thus, systems integrators seeking to win
performance-based, post-production business from for-profit clients (e.g. airlines and
railroad shippers) should expect greater improved performance outcomes from their
PBL efforts. Conversely these integrators should expect less PBL leadership and lower
outcomes from not-for-profit clients. Additionally, not-for-profit system operators and
bill payers are cautioned when adopting commercial benchmarks of PBL success,
while maintaining counter-PBL behavior (e.g. lack of trust, lack of relationship, lack of
investment). In fact, the same results may not be realistic.
Another contribution of this study is the development of valid scales to measure
PBL effectiveness, investment climate, and PBL leadership. Supply chain scholars can
use these scales to conduct further research of PBL strategies. Tools such as this enable
further theory testing in a field that appears on the threshold of significant
developments and achieving the status of a distinct discipline.
There is a growing body of research applying SDL to supply chain management
(Lusch, 2011; Randall et al., 2010). This research adds to that body. Measuring the
dependent variable of a service-based outcome presents a challenge. Knowledge-based
value propositions are dynamic, intangible, and evolutionary. This dynamism makes
their capture difficult. PBL as a theory begins to bridge this gap by articulating a group
of metrics that represent customer value. Further, the PBL-SDL framework addresses
measurement of value for each of the supplier network members. This has been an
elusive task. In this study, we capture network value using the PBL effectiveness
construct. In the Randall et al. (2010) investigation, they articulated a dependent variable
measure of SDL effectiveness as continuous value creation. These two studies, taken
together, demonstrate how supplier network value is created by allowing feedback in the
form of financial incentive, knowledge of the customer, and strengthening of competitive
position through creation of a service-based network competency.
The testing of H5 appears to support suggestions that SDL in practice – in this case
represented by PBL – drives higher performance on a wide range of variables
(e.g. leadership effectiveness, relational exchange, innovation) associated with superior
competitive position. This is an important finding, one that bolsters the positioning of





The relationship between PBL as a supply chain theory and SDL has important
implications for the logistics domain. Addressing deficiencies in supply chain theory is
a pressing issue which has implication for SCM as it reaches the status of a distinct
discipline (Harland et al., 2000). SCM continues to suffer from a lack of theory-based
studies (Defee et al., 2010). PBL theory grounded in SDL provides a key theory to assist
in SCM’s evolution as a discipline. PBL represents a governance structure that drives
responsibility for supply chain transactions to those entities most capable of
completing those transactions at the least cost, and lowest risk.
5.1 Limitations and future research
This study is not without limitations. First, the research design relied upon
self-reported data from respondents that may introduce common method bias. Second,
whereas the model explains 53 percent of the variance in PBL effectiveness, we wonder
whether PBL effectiveness, while a distinct construct in the minds of the practitioners,
may in fact be multi-dimensional yet highly correlated. There appears to be reason to
consider whether PBL effectiveness is in fact an amalgamation of PBL-driven
innovation and alignment. Follow-on research should address this possibility. Third,
survey responses were drawn from a convenience sample rather than a random
sample, and the sample size of 61 is relatively small when making statistical inferences
from the data. This could have impacted the normality of investment climate. Fourth,
the survey narrowly targeted defense industry applications of PBL. Despite its
limitations, the findings are important and, as such, demonstrate the promise of this
line of inquiry – which should be expounded. Indeed, the JSF program will use PBL
entirely for post-production support. With its $1 trillion life cycle cost, it is the largest
government program ever (Government Accountability Office, 2008). Fifth, future
research should test other determinants of PBL effectiveness such as team innovation,
metric appropriateness, and team learning (Geary et al., 2010). Further, contingency
theory could be applied to show contextual differences in PBL effectiveness (Bowersox,
1990; Fawcett et al., 2008; Moorman and Slotegraaf, 1999). Differences could be
explored where:
. operators and systems integrators use firm-fixed price versus cost
reimbursement contracts; and
. whether PBL effectiveness differs by industry.
Finally, future research should expand the generalizability of findings by expanding
the population beyond defense systems.
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1. The first use of this chart known to the authors was by PRTM to the Department of Defense
(2005). Versions have also been presented by Randall (WBR PB Log Conference in 2008, 2009
and 2010) based upon dissertation research. University of Tennessee Center of Executive
Education has also presented versions of this chart.
2. Complex systems usually involve a bill-paying customer who is often responsible for the
initial system creation and operation. This bill-paying customer is many times not the
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IC1 Leadership welcomes new ideas
IC2 People are empowered to make decisions
IC3 People act entrepreneurial
Relational exchange
RE1 Industry and government trust
RE2 People know how their work impacts the end customer
RE3 Communication between industry and government is effective
PBL leadership
L1 Leadership has a long-term focus on affordability and performance
L2 Leaders align activities to achieve warfighter goals
L3 Leadership accepts risk taking
PBL effectiveness
PBL1 System performance is improved
PBL2 The project team has a shared vision of its purpose
PBL3 There are clear sustainment objectives
PBL4 There is significant innovation
PBL5 Cost is avoided
PBL6 Incentivizes investment in reliability
PBL7 This strategy is likely to find money to avoid costs
PBL8 Uses knowledge and skill to improve performance and affordability
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